USA v. Keith Stephens by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-23-2011 
USA v. Keith Stephens 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Keith Stephens" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 160. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/160 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1513 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KEITH STEPHENS, 
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District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
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____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.1
 Keith Stephens appeals his sentence of four months of incarceration and one year 
of supervised release that was imposed upon a revocation of supervised release.  His 
 
 
(Filed : November 23, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
___________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
1  Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting 
by designation. 
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attorney maintains that there are no non-frivolous issues to appeal and moves to withdraw 
as counsel under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  We will grant the motion 
and affirm the sentence. 
I.   
 We write for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  In 2006, Stephens entered into a plea agreement with the Government in 
which he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C.     
§ 1029(b)(2).  He was sentenced to 43 months of imprisonment followed by three years 
of supervised release and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $222,652.   
Stephens’s period of supervised release commenced on December 17, 2007.  On 
December 15, 2010, Probation filed a Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender 
Under Supervision due to the following alleged probation violations:  (1) several 
instances of failing to report to his probation officer, (2) failing to notify Probation of a 
change of address, and (3) failing to comply with the restitution order.  On January 19, 
2011, Probation added a fourth violation, alleging that Stephens failed to inform 
Probation of his purchase of real estate and incurrence of a $130,000 loan secured by a 
mortgage on the real estate. 
At Stephens’s revocation hearing on February 8, 2011, pursuant to an agreement 
between the parties, the Government dismissed the first and third violations and Stephens 
pled guilty to the second and fourth, both C violations.  After a colloquy, the District 
Court accepted Stephens’s plea.  The United States Sentencing Guidelines range for the 
two C violations was 4–10 months imprisonment.  The Government requested a six-
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month prison sentence with 24 months of supervised release.  Stephens’s counsel 
requested four months of house arrest followed by six months of supervised release and 
pointed to the following as mitigating circumstances:  (1)  the violations had occurred 
almost a year before the petition for revocation at a point when Stephens had almost 
completed his supervised release, and (2) Stephens was unable to keep up with restitution 
or child support for his three children because he was unemployed and relying on his 
girlfriend and mother financially.   
The District Court sentenced Stephens to four months of incarceration but 
recommended that it be served at a community confinement center or halfway house.  
The Court also sentenced Stephens to a year of supervised release.  Stephens was directed 
to self-surrender on March 28, 2011 and was designated to the Metropolitan Correctional 
Center in New York, New York.  Thereafter, he twice requested deferral of surrender, 
questioning why he was not sent to a halfway house.  On February 22, 2011, Stephens 
filed a timely pro se notice of appeal of his sentence.2
Counsel may seek to withdraw from representation if, after a conscientious 
examination of the District Court record, he or she is “persuaded that the appeal presents 
no issue of even arguable merit[.]”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2008); see also Anders, 386 
U.S. at 744.  Evaluation of an Anders motion requires a twofold inquiry:  (1) whether 
  His counsel on appeal thereafter 
moved to withdraw and filed an Anders brief in support of the motion.   
II. 
                                              
2  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e)(3), and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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counsel has thoroughly examined the record for appealable issues and has explained in a 
brief why any such issues are frivolous; and (2) “whether an independent review of the 
record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  If we determine that “the Anders brief initially appears adequate on its face,” 
the second step of our inquiry is “guided . . . by the Anders brief itself.”  Id. at 301 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  A District Court’s revocation of supervised 
release and corresponding sentence are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010);  Gov’t of V.I. v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 297 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  “Absent procedural error, we will affirm the sentencing court unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Doe, 617 F.3d at 770 (quotation 
marks omitted). 
We conclude that counsel’s Anders brief is adequate, and thus, it will guide our 
independent review of the record.  Stephens’s counsel asserts that (1) there is no evidence 
that Stephens was incompetent or unable to understand the revocation proceedings, and 
(2) his plea was entered voluntarily after a thorough colloquy in accordance with Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32.1(b).  We agree that the plea colloquy complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b) 
and that Stephens’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.  The District Court asked 
Stephens whether he had consulted with counsel, understood the repercussions of his 
plea, and was pleading voluntarily.  Thus, our independent review of the record confirms 
that an appeal on the basis of the guilty plea would be wholly frivolous.   
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Stephens’s counsel also opines that the sentence was not an abuse of the District 
Court’s discretion because the four-month sentence was at the bottom of the advisory 
Guidelines range and Stephens received only one out of two possible years of supervised 
release.  Nor does it present a problem, she argues, that Stephens was designated to a 
correctional facility instead of a community confinement center because the District 
Court only recommended (and did not order) that he be incarcerated in an alternative 
facility.  United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 778 n.23 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] district 
court has no power to dictate or impose any place of confinement for the imprisonment 
portion of the sentence.”).  
We agree that any challenge to the plea colloquy, sentence, or location of 
Stephens’s incarceration would be frivolous.  The District Court considered the factors 
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and chose a sentence that was at the low end of the 
Guidelines range.  There is nothing in the record indicating that the sentence was 
inappropriate.  We conclude, therefore, that counsel has adequately shown that there are 
no non-frivolous issues and our independent review of the record reveals that there are no 
appealable issues of merit.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and will 
affirm the sentence of the District Court.   
 
